Sorting Out Transgenderism
One of the most contentious and divisive debates in the modern world concerns transgenderism. the contentiousness is inflamed and stoked by obstinate refusal of the curators of public discourse to permit elementary and clarifying distinctions.
The first class of such neglected distinction concerns the simple definitions of “man” and “woman.” Transgender advocates assert that the definition is purely a subjective description of what sex a particular person feels like at a particular time. Transgender skeptics adhere to more obvious and objective definitions. The assumption underlying this impasse is false. There are, in fact, several ways to define “man” and “woman” that are rational, and useful.
One way to describe a person’s sex is to do so anatomically. This is a simple assessment of whether that person’s body has or does not have certain features. The terms “male” and “female” are instructive in this this assessment, as they are functional and physical descriptions. We speak of male and female plumbing fixtures and electrical connections, because of the simple utility of identifying the part that is designed to go into a complementary part as male, and the complementary part as female. There are no moral or political biases in such a useful description.
If a person has a penis, that person is an anatomic male, if instead that person has a vagina that person is an anatomic female.
We may also define “man” and “woman” on the basis of objective genetic features. A woman has XX chromosomes, and a male has XY chromosomes. Ordinarily these determine the anatomic characteristics, or phenotype of the person, but not always. Certain defects in specific gene function may lead to a person with XY chromosomes, for example, to have female genitalia. Other people may have a particular chromosomal anomaly, such as XXY or XYY yet still have discernable anatomic characteristics. Others may have ambiguous genitalia. The key point however is that a person may be reasonably called a genetic male or a genetic female without implying a moral judgment or an ideological taunt. There is nothing inherently offensive in noticing objective facts.
Another category of definition involves what might be called psychological males and females. These are people whose self-perceptions align with a particular anatomic sex, whether or not their anatomy, or genetic make-up does. These are the people who claim to be a particular sex, not limited to the two obvious ones, because they “identify” with it. This is the class that transgender advocates treat as the only legitimate class, with hate and bigotry the only possible motivations for questioning the defining perceptions or for considering other definitions of man and woman.
This is an inherently vague and ambiguous class, because its members may have some psychological and emotional affinity for the sex that does not correspond to their anatomic or genetic characteristics, making classification a matter of degree rather than a strictly binary determination.
Recognizing these disparate definitions, rather than simply insisting on one to the exclusion of all others, especially ideologically congenial ones, would be very useful to resolving certain cultural conflicts that attend the issue of transgenderism. For sample, it would seem to be perfectly defensible to say that anatomic ales should not participate in female contact sports or be incarcerated in female detention facilities. This would be consistent with the rationales for having separate categories for women’s sports and women’s prisons in the first place. The genotype or psychological identification would be secondary considerations to the obvious advantages that accompany the defining anatomic features. These practical considerations need not invoke other disputes within transgender controversies, such as the use of pronouns.
Many practical issues regarding transgenderism could be addressed by recognizing that there is more than one way to define man and woman and recognizing that some definitions are more useful to practical problems than are others.
A second group of distinctions that inhere in transgender controversies arise from the obvious fact that not all persons who claim to be transgender do so for the same reason. The facile and opportunistic insistence that all transgender people are simply people of one sex trapped in the bodies of the other is itself a form of bigotry.
The first group of people who claim to be transgender is those who may legitimately be considered such. They have such a strong identification with the sex that is not the one consistent their anatomic features that this identification causes them great distress. This distress is not the result of any popular response to their condition but is inherent in the incongruity between their perceptions and their physical reality. It is the result of a person being a definite psychological female and male anatomic male, or vice versa. The distress is also what makes the condition a disorder. Another characteristic of this disorder is that it may, in certain circumstances be improved by interventions to make the anatomic features of the person consistent with the psychological identification, i.e. it can be treated, albeit very radically. This group of transgenders, the true transgenders, is exceedingly small.
The second group of people who claim to be transgender are those previously described as having autogynophilia. They identify with the opposite sex as part of their sexual orientation, rather than perception of their sex. This group is distinct from the first in that, while the former is distressed by incompatibility between anatomic and psychologic sex, the latter takes pleasure in it. The fantasy of being the opposite sex, rather than the conviction that one should be the opposite sex is its defining feature. For this reason, members of this group often do not seek surgical intervention, because it is unnecessary. This group is considerably larger than the first.
A third category may be termed the opportunistic transsexual. These are people who identify as the sex opposite their anatomic sex because doing so gives them the opportunity to access sexual opportunities, or to access benefits available only to one sex. These are the people include men who claim to be transgender so they can be moved to a woman’s prison for personal sexual goals, or to use the woman’s locker room for the voyeuristic opportunities it presents. Some claim to be transgender simply because it annoys people that they do not like. This class demonstrates a high degree of sociopathy and is probably about the same size as the second group described above.
Another class consists of those who may be called “social transgenders.” This group, which apparently consists of a disproportionate number of adolescent females and young women, identify as transgender for social reasons. they may do so as acts of rebellion or paradoxical assertions of individuality. They may claim to be transgender as a way to escape what they see as social expectations of their anatomic sex. These people also tend not to undergo surgical modification, although some do.
Some people are considered transgender, when what they really are is delusional. They not only identify as the opposite sex, but they also think that they physically and anatomically are the opposite sex, despite readily identifiable evidence to the contrary. their affliction is similar to the Cotard delusion in which the sufferer believes that he or she is dead or does not exist. These are the men who believe that they are pregnant, or the women who believe that they got someone else pregnant. Treatment for psychosis often resolves their transgender identity.
Not all of the advocates of transgenderism are themselves transgender. Their advocacy has disparate motivations, some of which should not be overlooked out of malignant politeness. In particular pedophiles have a vested interest in advocating for and legitimizing the sexuality and sexual expression of children. The use of puberty blockers is a particularly concerning issue. It is prudent to discuss transgender topics keeping the potential collateral consequences in mind.
Transgenderism is not new. It is hinted at in Greek mythology. The emperor Nero castrated and then married a male slave, because he was said to resemble Nero’s dead wife, Poppaea Sabina. This can be seen as an early practice of transgenderism, although having nothing to do with the gender identification of the person involved.
The contemporary debates over transgender issues are primarily cultural and political debates. They rage because of a tacit agreement to avoid the obvious. they are not primarily debates about rights or bigotry or hate. They are the inevitable result of a culture that is becoming increasingly unsure of itself.